BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report

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BP has published its internal investigation into the accident on the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2010. The investigation found that no single factor caused the Macondo well tragedy. Rather, a sequence of failures involving a number of different parties led to the explosion and fire which killed 11 people and caused widespread pollution in the Gulf of Mexico earlier this year. Read the full report and more at http://bit.ly/BP_Report


Juan Garnica says:

Who came here after watching the movie?

Tony Cabello says:

Typical oil company men cutting corners to save money

LadyMonoceros says:

I'm not an oil rig personnel, nor have I even been around the industry, but I'm an instrumentation and electrical student. Watching this video as an assignment.

Still, I saw many mistakes made during the beginning of the video when the narrator went through the procedures performed by the BP workers.

Two of the main mistakes that I noticed were the cement issue and the leak that followed after.

What really threw a red flag for me was the increase of pressure while the pumps were off! That's basic mechanical knowledge when dealing with psi! If the pressure is still increasing and the motors aren't running, you've got a problem that needs to be fixed.

I understand that the narrator mentioned variables that may have caused the workers to overlook this issue, but with such high concerns of safety that my teachers have continuously emphasized through my time of study, surely this mysterious rise in pressure should have been thoroughly checked out. Confirmation of all data is important.

doomtomb3 says:

I wonder if there is a version in Layman's terms of what happened.

SamuelP says:

The number of centralizers to be used is vital in aiding a good cement job. Major flaw going with only six. Why leave out that Halliburton warned about severe gas flow problems following a bad cement job because of non-centralized pipe? Why not highlight the incomplete bottoms up? Halliburton warned about this as well – risk of trapping hydro carbons in the top of the well. How about your conclusion on no losses during the cement job ? How exactly do you go forward measuring volume changes in a foam cement in the field ? (when it is 100bbl on the mixing unit and then the same batch is only 50bbl when pumped…) I can tell you that would require advanced computer simulation tables. Why did you skip the cement bond log, and not perform TOC? (tag top of cement ) Why did you rush testing the cement job and not wait the 48h before ? Halliburton said it would require that amount of time for the cement to cure. Why not question the fact that the Transocean toolpusher asserted the evidence from the negative pressure test was due to a well leak but BP company man said no – it is an anomaly from the riser leak?? And who does not see the gravity of a pressure change in the drillpipe from 273psi to 1250psi in six minutes?! That later increased to 1700psi and then fell to 700 – before it shot back up to 1300psi.. something strange going on maybe ? How do you justify operating with only one well barrier intact during the temporary abandonment procedure when the hanger seal was set AFTER displacing the mud with seawater? Let's say something about the automatic shutdown system ESD, that was set in manual mode by rig crew before the incident. I would not call that an equipment failure.. more bad mistake. Fair enough you didn't mention the miswiring in the SEM modules on the bop control pods, this was uncovered by nasa at a later time, 27V battery low voltage is correctly another fault though. You failed to mention that the mudloggers advised against offloading mud to the supply vessel whilst you were doing the final displacement of mud to seawater – and you went ahead anyways. This means no volume control, hence why the influx freely flowed up to the rig. And why not mention that you in the first place wanted to save some money so you went with the long string 7in -> 9 5/8in instead of a normal tieback solution? The latter would provide better barrier function against influx of hydro carbons. You so nicely claim in the beginning of the video that you are not playing the blame game, but you are deffinately not playing the honest game either. People who watch this: keep in mind that hearing the one side of the story does not reveal the complete truth. I wrote this because I was so astounded by the lack of and misinformation delivered in this video. My thoughts go out to the rig workers who both made it home from this tragedy and also those who did not, their families included. May their souls rest in peace and this sort of accident never happen again.

Pisk Six says:

There is no mention of the decision to not run a cement bond log following the cement job. The logging company crew and tools were on board, however BP chose to not carry out the CBL. I believe the reason invoked by BP was it was not deemed necessary during the drilling phase, and would have been done after. Given the technical difficulty of running a nitrified cement job, it would have made sense to verify the integrity by running the CBL/VDL log. Such a log would have identified the cement job was not successful. Why did you leave out such an important part in your narrative?

Silver Mountain says:

A cajun man wrote this song during the oil spill, check it out: search “Oil Apocalypse” by “Krewe of Black Flood” or follow this link:

Azibato Oruene says:

This is objectively informative. Thanks

All Sewe says:

I can't believe all you commenters missed the key/root cause of all the subsequent events  Haliburton tested the cement in their lab for weeks and COULD NOT!!! get a successful test  so after several mixtures they found a marginal test pass and sent to the rig..   hmmm  hmmmmm   should the crew have caught it — maybe? — but the world will never know.

Anonymous says:


andyermum says:

I actually caught the street-spy communications for this attack.  I was in new orleans at the time.  and they had spys pass the messages right in front of me.
at this point all the companies know it was hit by a secret military strike. probably paid for by another oil company or group of rich people. but they wont say anything in public because of the damage it caused 

thommy bosis says:

The first and foremost mistake was made when authorities allowed BP to begin drilling 13000-foot-deep well, 5000 feet below the surface in the middle of Louisiana's seafood production waters. Crucial question is what are you going to do if your blow-out preventer doesn't work when your 5000-foot-long, 20-inch casing breaks in the middle of the ocean? BP people would have explained:" Those sets of circumstances are unlikely to occur simultaneously". The lesson learned from this story is:" Hope for the best, but plan for the worst!!!".

bloodjl says:

One thing, its was made known that the cement being used was unsafe and would not hold.  But they used it anyway.

kaznW says:

Good explanation, a bit wishy washy though. Conservative explanations but people can read the full report if they wanted to.

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